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Abstract 
This paper attempts to reconstruct the concept of social domination articulated 
in the early works of Axel Honneth, a key figure of the ’third generation’ of critical 
theory. The author argues that one of the key ambitions of the early Honneth, expressed 
trhough his critique of Jürgen Habermas, was to theorize the process of societal 
reproduction in contemporary capitalism in ’action-theoretic’ terms, i.e. as determined 
by the inter-group dynamics of social conflict and domination, as opposed to 
Habermas’ systems-theoretic approach. The author analyzes Honneth’s criticism of 
Habermas developed in ’The Critique of Power’, and focuses more narrowly on 
Honneth’s conceptualization of social domination outlined in the early article ’Moral 
Conscioussness and Class Domination’. The analysis grounds the author’s subsequent 
reconstruction of the early Honneth’s conception of social domination as a two-
dimensional phenomenon that encompasses an ’intentional’ and a ’structural’ 
dimension. Turning towards Honneth’s mature perspective, the author argues that a 
critique of social domination no longer occupies a central place in Honneth’s 
influential theory of recognition. Finally, the author considers Honneth’s only recent 
attempt at theorizing domination presented in the article ’Recognition as Ideology’, and 
argues that Honneth has so far missed the opportunity to integrate the early social-
theoretical perspective on domination into his mature theoretical system. 
Key Words: Honneth, social domination, social conflict, critique, action theory, 
ideology, social pathology 
 
 
 
 
In this paper I argue that in some of his most important early works, the 
philosopher and social theorist Axel Honneth, a key figure in the ’third generation’ of 
the Frankfurt School and critical social theory more generally (Anderson, 2000), 
articulates a fruitful outline of a theory of social domination in contemporary capitalism 
through  a critique of  Juergen Habermas, the central figure of the ’second generation’ 
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of critical theory. I argue that Honneth’s early theoretical work puts forward a 
promising outline of a theory of social domination that goes beyond Habermas’ narrow 
focus on social pathology in the form of the ’systemic colonization of the lifeworld’. 
However, the outline of a theory of domination is not systematically elaborated within 
Honneth’s mature theory of recognition, where the role of social domination and social 
conflict becomes marginalized, and the theoretical focus shifts, as in Habermas, towards 
the conceptualization of social pathologies of contemporary capitalism. On the basis of 
the reconstructive analysis, I formulate a two-dimensional conception of domination 
that, as I argue, underpins Honneth’s social theory prior to the development of the 
’struggle for recognition’ perspective. In the concluding section, I focus on Honneth’s 
mature theory of recognition, arguing that, apart from introducing the notion of 
’ideological recognition’ into his conceptual apparatus, the mature Honneth once again 
shifts the focus of his work to one central preoccupation of both the first-generation 
Frankfurt School and Habermas  - to the phenomenon of the ’social pathologies’ of late 
capitalism. 
 
I The first-generation Frankfurt School: late capitalism as a ’pathological’ social 
formation  
 
In order to clarify the context of Axel Honneth’s early critique of Habermas 
which grounds the outline of his theory of social domination, I will briefly discuss the 
first-generation Frankfurt School’s perspective on domination in the broader context of 
its Marxist philosophical foundations, and will then turn to some of the most important 
domination-theoretic implications of Juergen Habermas’ famous ’linguistic’ turn.  
One defining characteristic of the first-generation theorists within the Frankfurt 
School tradition such as Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno was an attempt to 
conceptualize ’late capitalism’ as a fundamentally pathological social formation (a 
’distorted life-form’), in which the various manifestations of intersubjective social 
domination (class domination) assume a rather epiphenomenal role with respect to the 
fundamentally pathological state of the social reality (see Horkheimer and Adorno, 
2007, Horkheimer, 2004, Adorno, 1981). The attempts of the dominant social groups 
(the capitalist class) to secure the legitimacy of the existing social order in late 
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capitalism do not, so to say, possess ’epistemological autonomy’ for theorists like Max 
Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, because the actions of the dominant social groups are 
determined at a deeper-lying level – that of a general structuring of the social reality on 
the pathological basis of the absolutization of instrumental reason, which shapes both 
the dominant and the dominated social groups’ state of consciousness and their action-
guiding principles.   
Within the perspectives of first-generation theorists such as Horkheimer and 
Adorno, the unjust division of labour1 and the ideological efforts of the dominant social 
groups to strengthen its legitimacy within the capitalist system – the primary forms of 
the ’structural’ and ’intentional’ intersubjective social domination – are, I would argue, 
both conceived as causally subsequent with respect to a more fundamental pathological 
cultural pattern of the late-capitalist Western societies, characterized by the ever 
expanding ’commodity principle’. Within the pathological formation of late capitalism, 
social actors come to internalize, through socialization, the primary action-guiding 
principle of capitalist reproduction – the infinite expansion of material social 
reproduction – as an end in itself, and no longer the means toward accomplishing other 
ends (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2007).  
Within such perspective, it seems that a societal revolution in the form of the 
abolishment of intersubjective social domination  - an exploitative system of 
production, unjust division of labour and the ideological efforts of the capitalist class to 
legitimize the former would be insufficient with regards to changing the pathological 
cultural pattern of modernity that absolutizes instrumental reason. As Juergen Habermas 
and Axel Honneth have pointed out in their respective critiques of the first-generation 
Frankfurt School, in the late works of Horkheimer and Adorno, such as The Eclipse of 
Reason or Negative Dialectics, the very possibility of revolution disappears, as the 
authors are treating the entire realm of social action as inherently instrumental-rational 
(e.g. the pervasive ’systemic thought’ in Adorno’s Negative Dialectics), and any social 
order based on organized transformation of the natural world as necessarily 
pathological, in the sense that it reduces the rational capacities of human beings to one 
single dimension (Habermas, 1990, Honneth, 1991).  
                                                          
1 An ’unjust division of labour’ is here understood in the classical Marxist sense – as the one that denies 
most social actors the possibility of exercising meaningful, non-fragmented work, which the Marxist 
theory of  human subject sees as essential for human self-realization. 
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This fundamental theoretical outlook of the Frankfurt School, as I see it, is 
essentially in agreement with the classical Marxist philosophy of history, more precisely 
its systems-theoretic conception of social reproduction which, taking its cue from 
Hegelianism, develops a teleological and functionalist understanding of history as the 
gradual perfecting of human capacities for transforming nature (their productive 
capacities). The possibility of social change (the formation of class consciousness and 
the outbreak of social conflict) and the general range of available options for socially 
transformative action are still determined within the first-generation critical theory by 
the structural properties of society at a given historical stage of the development of 
productive forces (Cohen, 2000). The pathological nature of the late-capitalist formation 
(its reduction of human rational capacities) is not conceived by Horkheimer or Adorno 
primarily in terms of inter-group social dynamics, in which the privileged groups 
monopolize the right to the ’reasonable conditions of life’ (Adorno, 2006) at the 
expense of the rest. It is instead defined as the result of a contradiction between the 
institutionalized form of societal rationality (instrumental reason, or the maximization 
of productive efficiency) and the achieved level of technological progress which no 
longer requires such exploitative social order for the sake of collective self-preservation.  
 
II Habermas’ ’linguistic turn’ and Honneth’s early work as a critique of the 
’pathological life-form’ thesis 
 
In my understanding of Axel Honneth’s perspective, one fundamental 
motivating force behind his theoretical project has been the ’action-theoretic’ conviction 
that the production and maintaining of the social order (in capitalism and in general) 
should not be understood in the above mentioned systems-theoretic terms, but in terms 
of the dynamics of ineraction between social groups, which is primarily characterized 
by the collective articulation of the social actors’ affectively laden normative 
experiences of social reality (Honneth, 1996, 1991). In endorsing such a basic 
theoretical orientation, Honneth is, I will argue below, opposed not just to Marxism and 
the first-generation Frankfurt School, but to Jürgen Habermas as well, since the Marxist 
dialectic of the forces (technological innovation) and relations of production (the legally 
institutionalized order of action-guiding principles) corresponds, in terms of a theory of 
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social change, to the Habermasian contradiction between the imperatives of 
communicative rationality and those of material social reproduction (systemic 
rationality) within modern societal formations (Habermas, 1987, 1984).  
Notwithstanding the fundamental epistemological and social-ontological 
differences between Habermas and the first-generation Frankfurt School that arose from 
Habermas’ famous ’linguistic turn’ in critical theory, their respective conceptualizations 
of social change are still homologous, in the sense of being both systems-theoretic and 
teleological2. The ’communicative rationalization of the lifeworld’ has an autonomous 
logic in Habermas’ perspective, insofar as it is driven by the normative force of 
everyday linguistic interaction oriented towards reaching an uncoerced consensus, and 
not directly constrained either by the imperatives of material social reproduction or by 
the unquestioned authority of the ’sacred’ (Habermas, 1987). As Habermas argues, the 
initially severely restricted, but nevertheless existent, exercise of communicative reason 
within everyday life slowly ’erodes’ the irrational symbolic order of pre-modern social 
formations and gradually replaces all forms of unquestioned authority as the basis of 
institutional justification (ibid).  
However, the process of social reproduction within Habermas’ perspective can 
always only partially rest on communicative reason, since the imperative of efficient 
material reproduction, unlike that of the normative justification of the social order, 
cannot be made contingent upon processes of rational deliberation. The imperative of 
efficient reproduction in modernity gives rise to the gradual institutionalization of 
systemic rationality in the modern social domains of the economy and the bureaucratic 
state, and the dynamic relationship between emancipatory social change and social 
’pathology’ is thereafter conceived by Habermas primarily in terms of the 
colonization/countercolonization processes, along with the further communicative 
rationalization of the ’lifeworld’ spheres (the nuclear family, the political public sphere, 
and the domain of cultural production). As in the first-generation Frankfurt School’s 
systems-theoretic conception of late capitalism as a ’pathological life-form’, neither the 
communicative rationalization (societal emancipation) in Habermas nor the systemic 
colonization of the lifeworld (social pathology) are phenomena that can be theoretically 
                                                          
2 The fundamental difference between the two perspectives in this respect is in the following: the first 
generation is using a one-dimensional concept of societal reason, which gives rise to both pathology 
(maximization of efficiency imperative) and emancipatory social change (technological innovations), 
whereas Habermas is using a two-dimensional concept of reason, in which one dimension is purely 
functional, the other purely normative (see Leist, 2008). 
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traced back to the power relations between social actors and groups, as Axel Honneth 
points out in his critique of Habermas (Honneth, 1991).  
There is, I would argue, even less scope in Habermas’ perspective for theorizing 
intersubjective social domination such as class domination as the phenomenon that 
fundamentally shapes a particular system of social reproduction, than there is within the 
first-generation Frankfurt School. Habermas introduces into critical theory the two-
dimensional concept of reason, and the corresponding differentiation between the 
systemic and lifeworld societal domains. This theoretical decoupling no longer enables 
the conceptualization of capitalism as a holistic system of societal reproduction3, which 
is still present in the first generation, and which presumes the constant necessity of the 
normative justification of economic and bureaucratic institutional arrangements 
(intersubjective social domination in the form of ideology) in capitalism as a 
fundamental component of successful reproduction. Moreover, the irrational spilling 
over of systemic imperatives into the institutionally protected, rationalized spheres of 
the lifeworld – systemic colonization – cannot be theorized in Habermas’ perspective in 
terms of inter-group societal dynamics, but only as a form of a depersonalized, 
macrostructural social pathology.  
In light of these observations, Axel Honneth’s theoretical project, I would argue, 
revolves around two crucial insights:  
1) that Habermas’ attempt to overcome the social-theoretical deficiencies of the 
first-generation theorists is characterized by an inability to substantially go beyond the 
latter’s systems-theoretic approach to social reality, and  
2) that Habermas’ two-dimensional concept of rationality destroys the basis for 
the critique of social domination in capitalism.  
One fundamental limitation of Habermas’ social theory, I would agree with 
Honneth, is to be found at the level of his social ontology which treats social action as 
conditioned by a new fundamental dialectic (that replaces the classical Marxist one) – 
that between the collective human imperatives of self-preservation and understanding. 
This social-ontological premise is the grounds on which Habermas builds his dualist 
social theory (system and lifeworld) and his systems-theoretic account of social change. 
As Honneth argues toward the end of his crucial early work The Critique of Power, the 
                                                          
3 This is very well observed by Deborah Cook in: Cook, 2004 
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central task that critical theory still faces after Habermas’ linguistic turn is the one of 
articulating a more empirically adequate account of social action that can serve as the 
basis for a re-invigorated critique of social domiantion (Honneth, 1991).  
 
 
III  The basic premises of the early Honneth’s theory of social action  
 
In The Critique of Power, Honneth extensively elaborates on the fundamental 
theoretical premises he had articulated in his first major work, Social Action and Human 
Nature, co-written with Hans Joas (Honneth and Joas, 1988). One such fundamental 
premise is that every successful social critique has to rest on a certain substantive 
theorization of human nature, and that it cannot escape a certain degree of 
philosophical-anthropological speculation.  
On the basis of this primary assumption, Honneth articulates, more or less 
explicitly, the following basic theoretical premises4:  
1) Social action is fundamentally shaped by the actors’ moral experiences in the context 
of interpersonal encounters – both the individual human consciousness and social reality 
are thoroughly normative phenomena.  
2) A conflict-theoretic argument that societal development, i.e. moral progress is to be 
understood primarily as the outcome of social struggles between groups of actors, 
which are in turn caused by the collective articulation of individual moral experiences. 
(Honneth, 1991). The early Honneth argues against the conception of social orders as 
’macrosubjects’ of history, in which social conflict is reduced to a ’dialectical’ property 
of a social formation that ’transcends itself’ (whether in Marxist terms, as the 
contradiction between the forces and relations of production, or Habermas’ tension 
between systemic and communicative rationality). 
3) Honneth has from the very beginning of his theoretical development defended an 
action-theoretic understanding of social reality, i.e. the view that the entire social 
structure (institutional framework) is directly produced and maintained in the realm of 
                                                          
4 A somewhat different and more exaustive presentation of Honneth’s fundamental theoretical premises 
can be found in Jean-Phillipe Deranty’s impressive study Beyond Communication (Deranty, 2009) 
8 
 
direct face-to-face social interaction and that there is no such thing as an autonomous 
’systemic’ dimension of society (Deranty, 2009). In light of premises 1) and 2), this also 
means that the production and maintaining of the social order is shot through with 
conflicts between social actors that arise out of the differences in their normative self-
understanding and the ways in which they experience the legitimacy of the existing 
institutional arrangements.  
4) Honneth’s understanding of social change and moral growth is non-teleological, as 
there is no guarantee of social progress ’deposited’ in the fundamental structure of 
social reality such as one finds in Habermas’ concept of the communicative 
rationalization of the lifeworld. The early Honneth argues against treating the process of 
social change as a teleologically guaranteed ’developmental unfolding’ of some 
emancipatory potential that is inscribed in the basic structure of social reality. Thus, 
Honneth is prepared, very much in the spirit of post-metaphysical thinking, to fully 
accept the contingency of history and societal emancipation. In other words, there is no 
guarantee that the actors’ moral experiences of injustice will lead to social conflict and 
institutional change. The likelihood of an articulation of the collective consciousness of 
injustice and the subsequent outbreak of a conflict depends primarily, in my 
understanding of Honneth, on the effectiveness of social domination practiced by the 
dominant social groups in a given formation – this will be discussed in more detail 
below. 
These fundamental theoretical premises reflect Honneth’s background in 
philosophical anthropology and pragmatism, as well as his early interest in formulating 
a more adequate historical materialism. The theoretical stress on the constitutive role of 
the actors’ normative experiences for the construction and maintaining of the social 
order is intrinsically linked to Honneth’s conflict-theoretic and non-teleological 
understanding of societal development. Honneth’s perspective presents a critique of the 
classical Marxist conceptualization of social conflict, more precisely the two 
fundamental premises it rests upon: the dialectic of the forces and relations of 
production as the ’motor of history’, and the premise that class struggle is primarily an 
interest-based social conflict. Honneth argues that the historically existing types of 
social conflict that have driven social change cannot be understood in terms of the 
’objective interest’ of the dominated groups in taking over the process of material 
reproduction (and thus improving their social-structural position), but that it can only be 
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causally explained through focusing on the actors’ subjective understanding of a given 
social order as normatively defficient. Moreover, this understanding is not a purely 
cognitive phenomenon, nor can it be conceived in terms of rational choice-making – it 
is foremostly a practical and affectively charged experience which requires a new 
theorization of the human subject to replace Marxist philosophical anthropology and 
Habermas’ focus on linguistic interaction. 
 
IV Honneth’s critique of Habermas’s systems-theoretic approach to social reproduction 
and change 
  
Honneth generally accepts Habermas’ linguistic turn as having considerably 
increased the philosophical plausibility and empirical adequacy of critical theory in 
comparison to the first-generation Frankfurt School, but he rejects Habermas’ theory of 
social action grounded in the concept of communicative reason. Already in Social 
Action and Human Nature,  Honneth (together with Joas) introduces the fundamental 
argument against Habermas in the form of a critique of evolutionism, which Habermas 
takes over from Marxism: as the two authors point out, ’the explanation of socio-
cultural evolution by developmental logic must abstract from the determinate complex 
of events and from the unique experiences within whose historical framework social 
groups act historically with momentous consequences’ (Honneth and Joas, 1988: 164).  
As soon as a developmental logic related to the fundamental structure of social reality 
(organized labour or linguistic interaction) is introduced into the explanation of social 
progress, the ’unique experiences’ and the particular ’complex of events’ lose their 
power of causation and are reduced, in a Hegelian fashion, to mere concrete instances of 
the dialectical self-overcoming of the social order conceived in monolythic terms. 
According to Honneth and Joas, on the other hand, the bearers of moral progress in 
history are concrete social groups acting upon their normative experiences of the 
existing order. 
In The Critique of Power Honneth formulates, through a reconstruction of the 
early Horkheimer’s work, the fundamental outline of his social ontology and theory of 
the social structure and change, that will serve as the basis of the theoretical system 
developed in The Struggle for Recognition (Honneth, 1996). Honneth arrives at his own 
10 
 
understanding of the role of critical theory by re-interpreting Horkheimer’s concept of 
’critical activity’ in the context of his action-theoretic premises:  
’critical activity is ... the reflexive continuation of an everyday communication shaken 
in its self-understanding. ... [S]ocial struggle can be conceived as the cooperative organization 
of this everyday critique: it would be the attempt by social groups, forced by the conditions of 
the class-specific division of labor and excessive burdens, to realize within the normative 
structures of social life the norms of action acquired in the repeated experience of suffered 
injustice’ (Honneth, 1991: 29, emphasis added).  
According to Honneth’s reconstructive critique, the early Habermas was able to 
develop, in contrast to the first-generation Frankfurt School, a specific understanding of 
social interaction as ’the struggle between social groups for the organizational form of 
purposive action’ (Honneth, 1991: 269). This is a big step forward, as Habermas 
introduces the idea of consensus into the analysis of power relations within a social 
order, and is able to think about social power in normative terms and understand that 
every form of social domination has to include a consensual dimension. ’With the 
introduction of the theory of interaction’, Honneth argues, ’the origin and exercise of 
social power is represented differently [in Habermas] than in the social theory of 
Adorno ... it is represented as a normative event’ (ibid: 244, emphasis added).  
However, Honneth argues that Habermas in his later works gives up on the idea 
of a morally motivated social struggle as an autonomous driving force of history and 
turns toward an evolutionist and systems-theoretic understanding of social change, 
which leaves little room for a theorization of power and domination. The latter no 
longer play a fundamental role in the process of social reproduction in Habermas’ 
mature perspective, since societal reproduction is determined by the interplay of the 
communicative and systemic dimensions of reason, not by concrete relations of power 
between social groups. In Honneth’s words, ’[Habermas] not only gives up the 
possibility of a justified critique of concrete forms of organization of economic 
production and political administration’, ’[he] loses above all ... the communication-
theoretic approach he had initially opened up: the potential for an understanding of the 
social order as an institutionally mediated communicative relation between culturally 
integrated groups that, so long as the exercise of power is asymmetrically distributed, 
takes place through the medium of social struggle’ (Honneth, 1991: 303). 
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 If the first-generation Frankfurt School had lacked a normative foothold for 
social critique located in an empirically effective instance of emancipatory reason, 
Habermas has in turn formulated, in Honneth’s understanding, an empirically 
inadequate normative foundation of critique: a social theory which neglects the 
fundamental role of conflict, power and domination in the process of historical moral 
growth and hypostatizes the consensual dimension of societal reproduction. Although 
Habermas theorizes social pathology in the form of the systemic colonization of the 
lifeworld, social domination as an intersubjective and inter-group phenomenon 
disappears from his analytical horizon.  
On the grounds of his critique of Habermas, Honneth formulates an outline of a 
theory of social domination in another important early work: the article ’Moral 
Consciousness and Class Domination’ (Honneth, 1995 [1982]).      
 
V The early Honneth’s critique of the ’deactivated class struggle thesis’ 
 
In this innovative early work Honneth elaborates his critique of Habermas’ 
perspective, arguing that Habermas’ grounding of critical theory in the concept of 
communicative reason leads to a distorted and inadequate understanding of the nature of 
the social actors moral expectations, as well as to a growing gap between moral-
philosophical undertakings and everyday social interaction (Honneth, 1995)5. Honneth 
reaches the conclusion that Habermas’ account of the normative structure of linguistic 
interaction, although itself an empirically plausible explanation of the normativity of 
language, has been hypostatized to represent the driving force of historical progress. 
Because of such a hypostatization, Honneth is arguing, a whole realm of moral claims 
that do not reach the level of discursive formulation drops out of sight. Honneth argues 
that ’Habermas must implicitly ignore all those potentialities for moral action which 
may not have reached the level of elaborated value judgments, but which are 
nonetheless persistently embodied in culturally coded acts of collective protest or even 
in mere silent ’’moral disapproval’’’ (Honneth, 1995: 208).   
                                                          
5 The importance of the essay can also be judged from the fact that it has been republished in Honneth’s 
more recent collection of essays, Disrespect: On the Normative Foundations of Critical Theory, in which 
he tries to further build on the insights from The Struggle for Recognition. Moreover, the arguments that 
Honneth here develops figure prominently in his exchange with Nancy Fraser (Honneth and Fraser, 2003) 
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Honneth questions Habermas’ solution to the ’central problem of critical 
theory’: how to make the ’connection between normative theoretical intention and 
historically situated morality’ (Honneth, 1995: 205). Since Habermas proposes that we 
identify ’the empirical bearers of socially innovative moral principles ... acording to the 
ethical level of their forms of moral conscioussness and ideas of justice’ (ibid: 208), he 
must reach the conclusion that the bearers of moral progress in contemporary 
capitalism, in which class struggle is largely been pacified through the achievements of 
the welfare state, are the post-materialist social movements which articulate 
qualitatively new normative demands (the feminist, ecological, movements for minority 
rights, etc). Criticizing this conception, Honneth argues that critical theory must not 
content itself with analyzing the social actors’ discursively articulated normative claims 
to justice, because the ability to articulate such claims at the level of argumentation that 
satisfies Habermas’ criteria of discourse ethics is itself a privilege related to the class 
standing of the actors engaged in articulation.  
To support this claim, Honneth makes use of some sources in the social history 
of the underclass, which point towards the conclusion that ’the normative systems that 
have been developed within the culturally qualified strata contain internally coherent 
and logically connected ideas of right and wrong’, whereas ’ the social ethic of the 
lower strata represents an uncoordinated complex of reactive demands for justice’, and 
that, accordingly, ’the social ethic of the suppressed masses contains no ideas of a total 
moral order ... abstracted from particular situations’ (Honneth, 1991: 209). Honneth 
borrows from Barrington Moore the concept of  ’consciousness of injustice’ to name the 
logic of the moral experiences of underprivileged social actors. This term should point 
out the primarily reactive and ’negative’ essence of these experiences, rather than 
treating a particular ’claim to justice’ as a deduction from some internally coherent and 
sophisticated vision of a good society, an application of a general context-transcending 
moral worldview to a concrete situation.  
Members of the oppressed social groups do not normally develop such a 
coherent vision of a good society, according to Honneth, precisely because of the 
effective exercise of class domination. First, the working class actors are not compelled 
by their social standing, as the dominant classes are, to justify the existing social order 
in terms of a comprehensive theory of justice (Honneth, 1995: 210). Second, as the 
result of the dominant groups’ symbolic domination, working class actors lack the 
cultural (linguistic) resources for articulating their experience of injustice in such 
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systematic terms. Moreover, the ’cultural milieu’ of the underprivileged groups does not 
require social actors to give such kinds of justifications for their own moral acts, it relies 
on the ’intuitive capacity of the actors’ to handle complex situations in a mature way 
(ibid: 211). Thus, members of the underprivileged groups do not develop an ’inferior 
moral consciousness’ in comparison with the ’progressive social movements’, it is 
rather class domination itself that causes these groups to lack the cultural resources to 
put forward a comprehensive critique of the social order.  
Accordingly, the disappearance of class struggle in post-war capitalism, as 
Honneth argues, is not the result of the welfare state’s capacity to ’institutionalize’ 
conflict and satisfy the expectations of the working class through various forms of 
compensation, but a product of ever more effective mechanisms of class domination. 
Honneth theorizes two principle mechanisms of the neutralization of class conflict: 
cultural exclusion and institutionalized individualization. Cultural exclusion ’consist(s) 
of stragegies that limit opportunities for articulating class-specific experiences of 
injustice by systematically withholding the appropriate linguistic and symbolic means 
for their expression’ (Honneth, 1995: 213). Institutional individualization, in turn, 
’consist(s) of all those strategies encouraged by the state ... that attempt to counteract 
the danger of communicative agreement on group- and class-specific experiences of 
injustice by either directly requiring or providing long-term support for individualistic 
action orientations’ (ibid: 214). The latter is a complex strategy of intersubjective social 
domination which includes the legal sanctioning of individualism, the fostering of 
individualistic worldviews and value patterns through cultural production and media, 
new forms of urban planning, etc.  
The two modalities of intersubjective social domination, according to Honneth, 
do not ’dissolve the consciousness of social injustice’ among the working class actors, 
but they ’co-determine the way it is experienced and made public’ (ibid). It is 
experienced in the already mentioned reactive and negative way, and when it is made 
public, one might add, it is often in the forms of violent protests which seem to be 
lacking a political agenda the way we conventionally understand it.  
On the basis of this conceptualization, Honneth is  able to develop a critique of 
the so-called ’deactivated class struggle’ thesis which figures prominently in Habermas’ 
work (Honneth, 1995: 216). The basic premise behind the thesis is that class struggle 
has been pacified because the demands of the working class have been ’compensated’ 
by a higher material standard of living and more free time, i.e. that the normative 
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demands of the working class actors for a just society have been ’deflected’ onto an a-
normative plane. What remains implicit in this ’critique’, according to Honneth, is the 
’central argument ... that the experiences of deprivation bound up with the social class 
situation lead to demands that can be fulfilled by means conforming to capitalism, i.e. 
the individual distribution of money and time’ (ibid). It turns out in the end that the 
’deactivated class struggle thesis’ accepts at face value the premise that the working 
class has been successfully co-opted into the system, which, according to Honneth, is an 
ideological claim.  
 
VI The two-dimensional conception of intersubjective social domination in the early 
Honneth’s work 
 
The early Honneth’s perspective, as articulated in The Critique of Power and 
’Moral Consciousness and Class Domination’, treats the phenomenon of social 
reproduction as simultaneously consensual and shot through with different forms of 
conflict, stressing the provisional nature of any normative consensus between social 
groups on which the legitimacy of a given institutional order (including the system of 
economic reproduction) rests. In the essay on moral consciousness in particular, 
Honneth argues persuasively that this provisional consensus in contemporary capitalism 
depends on certain processes, such as the ’institutionalized individualization’ (a form of 
’legal’ domination) and the ’cultural exclusion’ of the lower social strata. These 
practices ensure that even though underprivileged social actors are able to experience 
the normative deficiency of the existing institutional order, they remain unable to 
translate their experiences into positively defined collective demands for social 
transformation. In other words, the early Honneth stresses the central role of symbolic 
(intersubjective) domination in the overall process of social reproduction, which 
encompasses both the ’cultural’ and the ’economic’ dimension.  
In the early Honneth’s perspective, social integration – the reproduction of the 
status hierarchies and material inequalities in a given order – depends on the 
complementarity, one might even say the ’dialectic’ of the intentional and structural 
dimensions of intersubjective domination (both of which have a symbolic – status – and 
material dimension). Relations of structural domination (unjust division of labour and a 
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hierarchical cultural pattern of identification) ’constitute’ social actors as unequal in 
terms of material resources and status. It is the task of different forms of intentional 
domination, such as the above mentioned strategies of neutralizing class-consciousness, 
to prevent the actors’ articulation of a critique of the unjust social formation. 
In my reconstruction of the early Honneth, the concept of social domination that 
underpins Honneth’s early works consists of the following two dimensions: 
1. The intentional dimension encompasses the different techniques of control 
and manipulation deliberately employed by the dominant social: domination through 
direct political control of the processes of normative institutionalization of worldviews 
(the earlier mentioned ’institutionalized individualization’) as well as the processes of 
the cultural exclusion of the lower social strata from the spheres of education, cultural 
production and the public debate.  
2. The non-intentional (or structural) dimension of social domination in 
contemporary capitalism – the unjust division of labour and a status order as the 
temporary and precarious ’normative compromises’ between struggling social groups – 
could be considered as operating at a ’deeper level’ of social reality, that of the very 
process of subject formation, and is responsible for the ’constitution’ of social actors as 
materially and symbolically unequal. Since it is not consciously devised and practiced 
by any individual or collective social actor, structural domination has an impersonal 
character, although it is constitutive of the interpersonal and inter-group inequalities.  
The early Honneth’s ’action-theoretic’ (and ’conflict-theoretic’) perspective on 
social reality, I would argue, presents a big step forward within critical theory in 
comparison to Habermas’ systems-theoretic focus on ’pathologies’ – a step towards 
both a post-metaphysical and more empirically adequate critique of social domination 
in capitalism. However, as I will argue below, the mature Honneth once again returns to 
a significant extent to the first-generation Frankfurt School and Habermasian legacy of 
’pathology diagnosis’ – one exception is his recent theorization of ’ideological 
recognition’. 
 
 
VII Mature Honneth’s shift towards social pathologies and the account of ’ideological 
recognition’ 
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In contrast to Habermas’ two-dimensional conceptualization of ’reason’ within 
social reality (communicative and functional), in his mature works Honneth articulates a 
new ’foundational’ concept which fuses explanatory and normative purposes – 
intersubjective recognition, understood as the universal precondition of human self-
formation. The Struggle for Recognition (Honneth, 1996) can be read as Honneth’s 
attempt to transform his criticism of Habermas from The Critique of Power and ’Moral 
Consciousness and Class Domination’ into a positive vision of a new critical theory, 
built on a conflict-theoretic account of societal evolution and reproduction. In 
Honneth’s fully developed perspective, as in the early works, the social order appears as 
a fragile institutionalized compromise – an outcome of the struggle between social 
groups with unequal symbolic and material power – regarding the scope and content of 
the fundamental evaluative patterns that structure social action. However, despite the 
fact that these patterns are shot through with power, there is an inbuilt claim to 
reciprocity in relations of mutual recognition.  
The Hegelian logic of Honneth’s theory of recognition stresses that if I fail to 
properly ’recognize’ my partner in interaction, my self-consciousness cannot obtain in 
return the same kind of ’recognition’ which I need for developing a positive self-
relation, since such recognition can only be provided by a properly recognized 
interactive partner. As Honneth argues, ’if I do not recognize my partner in interaction 
as a certain type of person, his reactions cannot give me the sense that I am recognized 
as the same type of person’ (Honneth, 1996: 38). In an essay titled ’Grounding 
Recognition’, Honneth also explains concisely the normative essence of recognitive 
acts: ’the implication of this line of thinking is that the reason why acts of recognition 
must be moral acts is that they are determined by the value or worth of other persons; 
acts of recognition are oriented not towards one’s own aims but rather towards the 
evaluative qualities of others’ (Honneth, 2002: 513). However, in The Struggle for 
Recognition Honneth in my opinion misses a crucial opportunity to elaborate on his 
early theoretical arguments regarding social domination. Honneth does not reintroduce 
in this work the fruitful arguments regarding the techniques of domination in 
contemporary capitalism – cultural exclusion and institutionalized individualization – 
both of which are primarily directed toward preventing the collective articulation of 
social discontent, i.e. toward neutralizing the actors’ struggles for greater recognition. 
The Struggle for Recognition provides new normative foundations for critical theory, 
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but it does not articulate a social critique, more precisely a critique of contemporary 
capitalism. In that respect, has the mature Honneth articulated a recognition-theoretic 
social critique in his subsequent works, based on the new normative foundations? I 
would argue that Honneth’s mature social critique is almost entirely devoted to the 
’pathologies’ of intersubjective recognition that the late-capitalist social formation 
engenders.  
Starting with the essays collected in Pathologies of Reason, Honneth begins to 
significantly shift his ’diagnostic’ approach to social reality, as he begins to espouse the 
first-generation Frankfurt School’s thesis that late capitalism represents a ’distorted life-
form’6. In ’A Social Pathology of Reason’, for example, Honneth argues that the core of 
critical theory consists in a definition of ’capitalism as a social form or organization in 
which practices and ways of thinking prevail that prevent the social utilization of a 
rationality already made possible by history’ (Honneth, 2009: 35). According to the 
Frankfurt School’s appropriation of Freud, social actors experience such reduction of 
historically effective reason as a certain form of suffering, and must therefore feel 
compelled in some way to overcome this suffering by unfettering the suppressed surplus 
rationality (e.g. Adorno, 1981). The mature Honneth thus defines contemporary 
capitalism as a social order which neutralizes the rationality-potential of modern 
societies that has historically been developed through social conflict.  
The new approach to critique is particularly evident in Honneth’s lectures 
Reification: A New Look at an Old Idea (Honneth, 2008). Honneth’s lectures articulate 
a bold argument which is firmly situated in the tradition of the original Frankfurt 
School: namely, that contemporary (neoliberal) capitalism engenders such forms of 
’thinking and conduct’ which prevent social actors from relating to each other in a fully 
human way. Honneth grounds his argument in an innovative interpretation of Georg 
Lukács’s concept of reification, focusing on its fundamental logic: when a subject, 
socialized under the conditions of the expanding ’commodity principle’, begins to treat 
her partners in interaction as mere instruments for an achievement of a particular goal, 
                                                          
6 The extent to which Honneth has changed his position on the first-generation legacy in Pathologies of 
Reason is evident in his largely positive reconstructions of Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s perspective in 
’The Possibility of a Disclosing Critique of Society’ and ’A Physiognomy of the Capitalist Life-Form’ 
(Honneth, 2005, 2009), which stands in stark contrast with his earlier assessment of Adorno from The 
Critique of Power and the essays in the The Fragmented World of the Social.  
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she is not commiting an epistemic ’category mistake’, nor is she behaving in a ’morally 
reproachable way’ – she is, rather, engaging in a form of ’praxis’ that is ’structurally 
false’ (Honneth, 2008: 26). Honneth argues that contemporary capitalist society is 
characterized by a partial restriction of the fundamental human capacity for affectively 
experiencing the world, as it engenders the formation of ’reifying’ action-orientations 
that are instilled into the individual’s consciousness through mechanisms of 
socialization.  
In his recent works grounded in the theory of recognition, Honneth has only 
attempted once again to engage in a theorization of social domination in an article titled 
’Recognition as Ideology’. In this article, conceived partly as a response to the 
criticisms developed in Recognition and Power, Honneth develops a concept of 
’ideological recognition’: the ’positive classifications whose evaluative contents are 
sufficiently credible for their addressees to have good reason to accept them’ (Honneth, 
2007b: 341). As Honneth argues, ’any new distinction granted to these addressees has to 
be able to alter their self-conception in such a way as to promise a psychic premium of 
heightened self-respect on the condition that they do in fact take over the abilities, 
needs, and virtues associated with this distinction as being their own’ (ibid: 341-42). 
Ideological recognition is not ’false’ or ’irrational’ in the sense that it differs in its 
internal logic from proper recognition; its ideological nature rather comes from the fact 
that it is not substantiated by improvements in the material life-conditions of the 
addressees that would allow them to realize the normative ’potential’ of the recognitive 
act in everyday interaction. Instead, the group or the institution that grants recognition, 
according to Honneth’s argument, has the aim of inducing the addressee (the worker) to 
accept a certain state of objective injustice (exploitation, bad working conditions) that 
goes along with recognition.  
Honneth’s primary example of ideological recognition, which echoes 
Boltanski’s and Chiapello’s The New Spirit of Capitalism (Boltanski and Chiapello, 
2007), is the new ’management literature’ adapted to contemporary, post-Fordist 
capitalism which, for example, introduces the term ’enterpreneur of one’s self’ instead 
of ’worker’ or ’labourer’ (Honneth, 2007b: 343). Such expressions, as Honneth argues, 
grant genuine recognition in the form of heightened social esteem to the ones they are 
addressed to, and enable them to develop a more positive self-relation, but they are used 
strategically to induce the workers to accept a greater workload and insecure jobs as if 
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these were instances of emancipation. With the introduction of the concept of 
ideological recognition, Honneth distinguishes between instances of genuine (materially 
substantiated) societal emancipation and those in which the emancipatory effects of an 
expanded pattern of recognition are, as it were, ideologically ’displaced’ since the 
recognitive act is neutralized by an unjust social order. However, the emancipatory 
effects are not completely annulled by this displacement, since, at the level of subjective 
experience, the workers do indeed ‘feel’ more autonomous in their redefined social 
roles. 
 
Conclusion: recognition and social domination – the missing synthesis 
 
With the above considerations I have tried to show that the mature Honneth has 
devoted little attention to the phenomenon of intersubjective social domination, 
nothwithstanding the attempt at conceptualizing ’ideological recognition’ as a form of 
intentional social domination in post-Fordist capitalism. He has instead attempted to 
situate his perspective more firmly in the tradition of the critical theory’s diagnosis of 
capitalism as a ’pathological life-form’ (whether absolutely pathological, as in the first-
generation theorists, or only partially, as in Habermas’ colonization thesis). Honneth has 
so far not attempted to integrate his fruitful early theorization of intersubjective social 
domination, which I have tried to reconstruct in this paper, into his mature recognition-
theoretic perspective.  
This is somewhat surprising, I would argue, since Honneth’s theorization of 
ideological recognition itself presented an excellent opportunity for Honneth to 
reconnect his mature social critique with the earlier conceptualization of class 
domination – let me briefly elaborate. Contemporary liberal democracies, I would argue 
in agreement with both Habermas and Honneth, are characterized by the ongoing 
processes of the universalization and de-formalization of positive law, on the one hand, 
and those of the individualization and equalization of cultural value-patterns on the 
other. At the same time, the already mentioned unjust division of labour persists within 
the post-Fordist capitalist formation – this structural contradiction is actually the 
foundation of ’ideological recognition’ as theorized by Honneth. The contradiction 
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manifests itself as an ever greater discrepancy in contemporary liberal-democratic 
capitalist societies between the ’potentiality’ (or the normative ’promise’) of legal 
respect and cultural esteem (two crucial dimensions of recognition in Honneth’s 
perspective) and the actuality of economic exploitation. To that extent, the act of legal 
or cultural recognition occurs within a system of social reproduction which embodies 
relations of structural domination between social groups.  
Citizens of the normatively advanced contemporary capitalism experience ever 
more legal and cultural recognition in terms of mature Honneth’s theory, but they are 
still structurally dominated (exploited, impoverished) by the ruling elites in terms of the 
early Honneth’s perspective on intersubjective social domination. Diffrent forms of 
intentional social domination are thus required more than ever in order to neutralize the 
possibility of the dominated actors’ interpretation of this structural contradiction in the 
form of a fundamental social injustice – precisely such forms of domination as the 
’institutionalized individualization’ and ’cultural exclusion’ of the underprivileged 
social groups that Honneth has theorized in his early article. For example, the 
contemporary capitalist managers who rely on ideological recognition as a strategy of 
legitimization must also rely on forms of institutionalized individualization such as the 
cultural pattern which individualizes the responsibility of social actors for their material 
circumstances, so that the above mentioned ’enterpreneur of the self’ accepts that the 
discrepancy between the normative promise entailed in the act of recognition and the 
impossibility of its fulfillment is her own fault, not an instance of structural social 
injustice. 
With his influential theorization of the struggle for recognition, Honneth has 
succeeded to an extent in realizing one of his crucial aims articulated in the critique of 
Habermas: to develop an alternative intersubjectivist theorization of the social reality 
which achieves an initial synthesis of the Foucauldian paradigm of conflict and the 
Habermasian paradigm of understanding. Honneth achieves this initial synthesis with an 
account of the ’morally motivated struggle’ of social groups over the normative 
frameworks (patterns of recognition) of social action.  
However, in developing his theoretical system Honneth mostly gives up on the 
second major aim from the above analyzed critique of Habermas – to redefine the 
Marxist theorizations of class struggle and the mechanisms of social domination on the 
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more empirically adequate grounds of intersubjectivist critical theory. As I would argue, 
Honneth has so far not fully realized the potential of his early outline of a theory of 
social domination by explaining how the struggle of the underprivileged social groups 
for greater legal respect and social esteem (the struggles for a universalist legal system 
and a just division of labour) become neutralized in contemporary capitalist societies 
through techniques of intentional social domination.  
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Pojam društvene dominacije u kritičko-teorijskoj perspektivi Aksela 
Honeta 
 
 
Apstrakt 
Rad nastoji da rekonstruiše koncepciju društvene dominacije formulisanu u 
ranim radovima Aksela Honeta, jedne od ključnih figura ,,treće generacije’’ kritičke 
teorije. Autor argumentuje da je jedna od ključnih ambicija ranog Honeta, artikulisana 
kroz kritiku teorijskog stanovišta Jirgena Habermasa, nastojanje da se proces društvene 
reprodukcije u savremenom kapitalizmu konceptualizuje u ,,delatno-teorijskim’’ 
kategorijama, kao proces determinisan među-grupnom društvenom dinamikom, 
nasuprot Habermasovom sistemsko-teorijskom stanovištu. Autor analizira Honetovu 
kritiku Habermasa razvijenu u delu Kritika moći, fokusirajući se na Honetovu 
konceptualizaciju društvene dominacije predstavljenu u ranom članku ,,Moralna svest i 
klasna dominacija’’. Analiza utemeljuje autorovu potonju rekonstrukciju koncepcije 
društvene dominacije u perspektivi ranog Honeta, kao dvodimenzionalnog fenomena 
koji obuhvata ,,intencionalnu’’ i ,,strukturnu’’ dimenziju. Preusmeravajući potom 
pažnju na Honetove zrelije radove, autor argumentuje da kritika društvene dominacije 
više nije u fokusu Honetove uticajne teorije ,,priznanja’’. Na posletku, autor razmatra 
Honetov jedini skorašnji pokušaj teorizovanja dominacije u članku ,,Priznanje kao 
ideologija’’, zaključujući da Honet do sada nije uspešno integrisao svoj rani društveno-
teorijski pristup fenomenu dominacije u okvire svog razvijenog teorijskog sistema. 
Ključne reči: Honet, društvena dominacija, društveni sukob, kritika, teorija 
društvenog delanja, ideologija, socijalna patologija 
 
 
